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A B S T R A C T
In April 2011, a workshop on recent research in empirical public finance took place in 
Cambridge, Ontario. Seven papers on various topics were presented by prominent 
academic economists. Each research paper was discussed and critiqued by two peers, 
and additional comments were offered by other participants in the workshop. This article 
presents a summary of each paper, along with a summary of the main points raised in the 
ensuing discussion.
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Columbia, Vancouver (e-mail: mrehavi@ubc.ca). The Tax Time workshop was organized by 
Kevin Milligan, of the Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, and Michael 
Smart, of the Department of Economics, University of Toronto, and generously sponsored by 
the School of Public Policy and Governance, University of Toronto, and the Canadian Tax 
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INTRO DUC TIO N
Governments around the world continue to seek practical solutions to a variety of 
complex policy problems, including poverty, long-term stability of social programs, 
income redistribution, economic stimulus, and the appropriate mix and levels of 
taxes. One input to the search for improved policy design is high-quality applied re-
search. Academics have long studied these issues in their research, but often in ways 
more abstract than policy makers find useful. This slows the translation of research 
insights into progress on the problems that our society needs to face.
Accordingly, there have been increasing calls for more “policy-relevant” academic 
research—research that attempts to bridge the gap between basic research and end 
users by being socially relevant and accessible, while remaining scientifically sound. 
We have seen a growing interest in the building of closer ties between the academic 
community and policy makers, as well as academia and the general public. Efforts 
in this direction have been aided by greater concentration of empirically focused 
researchers within the academic study of public finance in Canada. Moreover, the 
broader dissemination of microdata—for example, through Statistics Canada’s data 
liberation initiative and Research Data Centre program—has put higher-quality 
data within the reach of today’s empirical researchers.
Against this background, the University of Toronto’s School of Public Policy and 
Governance and the Canadian Tax Foundation co-sponsored the Tax Time workshop, 
held in Cambridge, Ontario in April 2011. The workshop provided an opportunity 
to showcase cutting-edge empirical research in public finance. The workshop also 
served to reinforce the connection between the academic community and the work 
of the Canadian Tax Foundation in promoting objective, policy-relevant research in 
Canadian public finance, and thus bridging the gap between the academic commun-
ity and policy makers.
This article provides a summary of the seven papers presented at the workshop. 
Each of the six research papers was discussed by the workshop participants and 
critiqued by two academic peers, and a synopsis of the discussion is included. (The 
seventh paper, by Thomas Lemieux, was an invitational lecture.) The authors and 
the topics of the papers, listed in order of presentation, are as follows:
n	 Kevin Milligan asks whether individuals who retire before the age of eligibility 
for full social security benefits are able to avoid economic hardship by explor-
ing their sources and levels of income in the transition period to retirement.
n	 Sami Bibi, Jean-Yves Duclos, and Abdelkrim Araar explore the implications of 
income mobility, both across time and across individuals, for progressive income 
tax systems, and consider whether the interactions are welfare enhancing.
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n	 Thomas Lemieux investigates the validity of theories that explain wage in-
equality. He assesses these theories in light of the large differences in wage 
inequality growth across countries and across time, and the extraordinary 
growth in the concentration of income at the top end of the distribution.
n	 David Albouy studies fiscal equalization payments. He argues that efficiency 
could be improved by redistributing source-based revenues more intensely in 
favour of residence-based revenues.
n	 Marit Rehavi reveals how partial reporting of charitable giving by US tax filers 
has led to inflated estimates of the tax price elasticity of charitable giving.
n	 Jean-Francois Wen and Daniel Gordon examine whether the tax and transfer 
system influences the choice between self-employment and employed labour.
n	 Ben Dachis, Gilles Duranton, and Matthew A. Turner use the introduction of 
the land transfer tax in the city of Toronto in 2008 to explore the effect of 
transfer taxes on real estate prices and transactions.
The 12 presenters and 12 discussants are listed with their respective affiliations in 
an appendix to this article.
K E V IN MILLIG A N—INCOME S IN 
THE TR A NSITIO N TO RE TIREMENT: 
E V IDENCE FROM C A N A DA
Increasing life expectancies and declining fertility rates are putting enormous pressure 
on public pension systems across Europe and North America. One policy response 
has been to raise the age at which retirees qualify for public pension benefits (“the 
retirement age”). The United States is phasing in an increase in the regular social 
security retirement age to 67, and Canada is phasing in larger incentives to encour-
age individuals to wait until at least age 65 before claiming Canada Pension Plan 
(CPP) benefits. The Canadian incentives include increases in both the penalty for 
claiming early retirement benefits and the rewards of delaying retirement beyond 
age 65. Penalizing individuals who choose to retire early has the potential to increase 
elderly poverty if those who are unable to continue working do not have sufficient 
outside funds. While some individuals choose to retire early, others are forced to 
leave the workforce as a result of illness, disability, layoff, prolonged unemploy-
ment, or mandatory retirement policies. The financial capacity of these individuals 
is a key consideration for policy makers, because past research has found that much 
of the decline in elderly poverty since the 1970s has been due to enrichment of the 
benefits available to low-income seniors.1 However, with the rise in alternative 
private savings vehicles such as registered retirement savings plans (RRSPs), tax-free 
savings accounts, and employer-sponsored pensions, individuals who face involun-
tary early retirement may have the resources to compensate for reductions in the 
generosity of public pensions.
 1 Kevin Milligan, “The Evolution of Elderly Poverty in Canada” (2008) 34, supplement Canadian 
Public Policy S79-94.
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Milligan explores this topic using the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics 
(SLID), a Canadian panel survey currently available for the years 1993-2008.2 Each 
panel covers six years, and a new panel is started every three years. The SLID is a 
valuable resource for researchers since it includes detailed information regarding 
the composition of income by source. Additionally, approximately 75-90 percent of 
SLID respondents give consent to the use of their T1 tax information as the source 
for their income data. This access to administrative tax and income data does not 
occur in other surveys. Milligan uses these rich data to “make a novel calculation—
determining the contribution of various supplemental income sources to lifting those 
not working at older ages out of a position of hardship.”3 All analysis described below 
is limited to retired men between the ages of 55 and 67, where “retired” is defined 
as individuals with no labour market attachments.
Surprisingly, Milligan finds few common characteristics among early retirees: 
“demographic, health, and job characteristics are not as predictive as one might 
expect in determining who will be an early retiree,”4 suggesting that unobserved 
factors appear to dominate the early retirement decision. As one might expect, “the 
age of public pension entitlement has a dramatic and large impact on individual 
incomes of those at the bottom of the income distribution.”5 While non-workers 
in the 90th percentile of the income distribution have fairly stable incomes well 
above the poverty line, those in the bottom 10th percentile have incomes under 
$1,000 a year until the age of 61. Income increases noticeably at age 61 and then 
jumps again at age 65. Milligan finds that government transfers are still an import-
ant source of income for early retirees. Twenty percent of “retirees” under the age 
of 60 still receive CPP benefits, and a similar percentage of those aged 55 receive 
social assistance. In addition, many of the early retirees studied have private resources. 
Half of those with zero earnings at age 55 have non-labour private income, with most 
of this income coming from private pensions and investment income. This share 
rises steadily to almost 80 percent by age 67.
Even with all of these supplemental supports, approximately one-third of men 
retired at age 55 live in families falling below the low-income cutoff (LICO).6 As 
 2 Kevin Milligan, Incomes in the Transition to Retirement: Evidence from Canada, working paper 
sponsored by the US Social Security Administration through a grant to the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (Cambridge, MA: NBER, September 2010) (www.nber.org/programs/ag/
rrc/NB10-09%20Milligan%20FINAL.pdf ). While the cross-sectional SLID files can be 
accessed through the DLI initiative, the panel data can only be accessed through Statistics 
Canada Research Data Centres.
 3 Milligan, supra note 2, at 3.
 4 Ibid.
 5 Ibid., at 28.
 6 Families are deemed to fall below the LICO when their share of income spent on food, shelter, 
and clothing is 20 percentage points or more above the average for Canadian families of similar 
size living in the same region of the country.
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expected, the percentage of men in families falling below the LICO declines as the 
men age into public retirement benefits and bottoms out at 6 percent for men aged 
64 (those eligible for full benefits).
It is important to note that assets that could support consumption while awaiting 
eligibility for full old-age benefits are not counted in these income measures. 
Therefore, those with seemingly low incomes may have sufficient wealth to support 
consumption. For example, individuals could spend down accumulated RRSP savings 
or home equity, or rely on loans and gifts from family members. To better under-
stand the potential financial vulnerability of these families, Milligan estimates their 
likely incomes (net of family obligations) in the absence of government pension 
support. He finds that over 20 percent of non-working men aged 55-64 have suffi-
cient incomes from sources other than public pensions to put them over the LICO 
threshold. Over 60 percent of the remaining men have spouses with positive in-
come, and that income is sufficient to lift almost 40 percent of the remaining men 
out of poverty. In addition, over half have non-spouse family income, and 15 percent 
have income either from their own or a family member’s RRSP withdrawals. In total, 
Milligan finds that three-quarters of men who appeared to be below the LICO 
threshold without public pension income had other sources of income sufficient to 
lift their families above the LICO. The actual number may even be higher since these 
figures do not include sources of income not available through the SLID, such as 
proceeds from the sale of financial or housing assets, gifts, equity loans, etc. Milligan 
concludes that
a majority of men who look as though they may suffer from very low incomes when 
looking only at their own income sources actually do much better when other alternative 
sources of funds are considered. However, this majority is slim, leaving a large minority 
of men who may suffer at ages leading up to full public pension entitlement.7
Comments
Ross Finnie and Michael R. Veall provided brief comments on Milligan’s paper. 
Much of the discussion centred on how to define retirement and the implications of 
that definition for assessments of financial capacity. It was agreed that the absence 
of any paid labour is a conservative definition of retirement and risks confounding 
the effects of involuntary unemployment and early retirement. It was noted that 
retirement means different things to different people: some people work, some do 
not, and some rely on different income sources at different times in the retirement 
cycle. This complicates the attempt to infer retirement from administrative data on 
earnings. If unemployment, unlike retirement, is unplanned, then those who are 
unemployed may be in a more precarious financial position than voluntary early 
retirees. If this is the case, the understatement of financial resources that Milligan 
documents could be even larger than he finds.
 7 Milligan, supra note 2, at 34.
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The difficulties in measuring the nature of labour force attachment raise the 
issue of whether researchers should focus on retirement or, instead, on the financial 
circumstances of individuals between the ages of 55 and 64. However, with the cur-
rent policy focus on the age of retirement, Milligan’s work is central to understanding 
the implications of raising the threshold. His analysis shows that individuals have a 
complex patchwork of private income sources and access to government support 
that mitigates the effect of rising retirement ages. However, if individuals are simply 
replacing retirement benefits with other sources of government support, moves 
toward raising the age of benefit qualification may not save the government as much 
money as expected.
SA MI  BIBI ,  JE A N -Y V E S DUCLOS , 
A ND A BDELK RIM A R A A R—MO BILIT Y, 
TA X ATIO N ,  A ND WELFA RE
Income mobility—the movement of individuals (or their offspring) across income 
groups through time—is often seen as a desirable feature of economies. The pres-
ence of income mobility suggests that poverty is not an end state and that distinctions 
between temporary and lifetime shocks are important. However, income mobility 
is not limited to upward movements in the income distribution. Some individuals 
will end up in a lower income group than the one in which they or their parents 
started. Thus, income mobility implies risk both within and between periods. If 
individuals are risk-averse, as is commonly assumed, mobility could have social 
welfare costs in addition to its more commonly highlighted benefits.
It is from this perspective that Bibi, Duclos, and Araar approach income mobil-
ity.8 They explore how mobility interacts with progressive income tax systems and 
ask whether such systems are welfare enhancing for risk-averse agents. Income mo-
bility reduces inequality over time, while a progressive tax code reduces inequality 
across income groups at a given point in time. Whereas previous research focused 
solely on the dynamics across individuals, Bibi et al. examine the welfare impact of 
income dynamics across both individuals and time. Their approach follows the 
spirit of mobility as an equalizer of incomes where inequality in permanent incomes 
is compared with the average inequality of periodic income. In this framework, 
“[t]he lower the level of permanent income inequality, the higher is income mobility 
deemed to be.”9 Bibi et al. extend this traditional view of mobility to capture the cost 
of the variability in the distribution of periodic incomes (a cost of income mobility 
that is typically overlooked). This combined framework allows them to explore the 
tradeoffs between mobility as an equalizer and a disequalizer across time, and also 
 8 Sami Bibi, Jean-Yves Duclos, and Abdelkrim Araar, Mobility, Taxation and Welfare, IZA Discussion 
Paper no. 5757 (Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor, June 2011) (http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1867026).
 9 Ibid., at 3.
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to “assess . . . the tax system’s impact on intertemporal social welfare”10 where tax 
progressivity improves both aspects of mobility.
Bibi et al. use the SLID to measure the social welfare effects of mobility and pro-
gressive taxation. They use six years of data, running from 1996 to 2001, to construct 
measures of income before and after taxes and transfers. They estimate that the 
overall cost of mobility in pre-tax income ranges from 2.09 to 10.84 percent of aver-
age pre-tax income. However, the tax system significantly reduces this risk, more 
than halving the variability cost of mobility. The decrease in variability also implies 
that mobility contributes much less to the equalization effect of permanent post-tax 
incomes than of pre-tax incomes. The impact of the benefits of mobility on the 
equalization of permanent pre-tax welfare ranges from 1.8 to 10.84 percent of mean 
pre-tax income and from 1.02 to 3.77 percent of mean post-tax income. That is, 
mobility increases equality in both distributions of income, but more so in the ab-
sence of taxes and transfers. Bibi et al. conclude that “the results . . . show that 
Canada’s tax and transfer system enhances considerably the redistributive effects of 
mobility while also lowering the cost of income variability.”11 That is, the net effects 
of both mobility and taxation on social welfare are usually positive.
Comments
This paper was discussed by Jim Davies and Tammy Schirle. Both noted the im-
portant implications of the paper for policy and the innovation of allowing mobility 
to both positively and negatively affect welfare. The traditional view of mobility is 
that permanent income is a good measure of welfare. However, by reducing income 
to permanent income, one ignores the costly uncertainty generated by fluctuating 
income. The approach taken by Bibi et al. makes it clear that mobility has two ef-
fects on social welfare: the social welfare cost of income risk and the social welfare 
benefit attributable to inequality is less for permanent income than for periodic 
income. In this case, whether or not mobility is beneficial is theoretically ambigu-
ous, as is the effect of tax progressivity.
One focus of the discussion of the paper was the authors’ decision to treat all 
income variability as costly uninsured risk. Some income fluctuations are predict-
able, and self-insurance (through precautionary savings), formal insurance markets, 
and capital markets enable individuals to partially smooth their consumption. As 
the proportion of risk covered by actuarially fair insurance increases, the welfare 
cost of income variability falls. In future work, one might want to decompose the 
income variability that people face. For example, it was noted that one might dis-
like income fluctuations, but be happy with an income that is steadily increasing over 
the life cycle. The workshop audience extended this train of thought to separating 
variability and permanent income shocks. That is, small year-to-year fluctuations 
 10 Ibid., at 4.
 11 Ibid., at 22.
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may be less of a concern than the risk of a permanent drop in income, such as that 
which may accompany a layoff and forced career change late in life. Incorporating 
temporary and permanent shocks into the analysis would require extending the data 
beyond the six-year panel available in this work and could be a rich area for future 
work.
THOM A S LEMIEUX—WAGE INEQUA LIT Y: 
A  COMPA R ATI V E PER SPEC TI V E
Inequality was also the theme of the workshop’s keynote address delivered by Thomas 
Lemieux. Lemieux presented an overview of his recent work on wage inequality and 
discussed past explanations of changes in inequality. Wage inequality has increased 
in most industrialized countries over the last two to three decades. There are, how-
ever, major differences across countries in both the timing and the magnitude of the 
growth in inequality. The explanations offered for these changes include techno-
logical progress and the computer revolution (skill-biased technical change, or SBTC), 
labour market institutions and social norms, and changes in the relative supply of 
highly educated workers. Tax policy may also explain some of the growth in inequal-
ity. Unfortunately, there remains little agreement on the relative contributions of 
these factors. Lemieux assessed the ability of each of these potential mechanisms to 
explain the large differences in inequality growth across countries and time, and the 
growing concentration of income at the top end of the distribution.
Lemieux began by reviewing the four “facts” about wage inequality established 
in Freeman and Katz’s seminal study:12
 1. Wage inequality increased dramatically at all points of the wage distribution 
for both men and women.
 2. Large increases occurred in age and, especially, education wage differentials.
 3. Wage dispersion increased within demographic and skill groups.
 4. Real wages of less-skilled/lower-paid workers declined (average wages were 
stagnant, and inequality increased).
Freeman and Katz documented that the increase in wage inequality began in the 
1980s, following on the coattails of large falls in wage inequality in the 1970s. They 
concluded that changes in labour demand were behind the growth in inequality and 
that these changes were mitigated by supply factors and institutions.
Freeman and Katz dubbed their theory the S-D-I explanation for changes in the 
pattern of wage inequality. The theory works as follows. Demand is the driving 
force behind wage inequality growth. Supply factors, particularly the slowdown in 
the relative growth of highly educated workers in the 1980s following the entry of 
 12 Richard B. Freeman and Lawrence F. Katz, eds., Differences and Changes in Wage Structures 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
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baby boomers into the workforce in the 1970s, partly mitigated the growth of in-
equality. Wage inequality rose more slowly in most countries other than the United 
States because supply factors increased faster as a result of educational catchup. In-
stitutions further mitigated the growth of inequality, particularly in those countries 
where wages were set by factors other than just supply and demand, restricting the 
ability of the wage structure to shift in response to supply and demand shocks.13 For 
example, many of the countries that experienced no or low growth in wage inequal-
ity were highly unionized countries and countries with minimum wage laws and 
wage councils.
Lemieux asked what has happened to inequality in the 16 years since Freeman 
and Katz. Does the S-D-I explanation for wage inequality fit recent developments? 
What role do taxes play in explaining wage inequality? He noted that there have 
been two major developments since the formulation of the S-D-I explanation. First, 
since the 1990s, changes in wages have been u-shaped. That is, wages at the top and 
bottom have kept growing relative to the middle of the wage distribution. This 
pattern is often referred to in the literature as “wage polarization.”14 Second, this 
u-shape can also be seen in the increasing returns to education at the post-graduate 
level and the stable returns to education at lower levels. The effect is more pro-
nounced for younger workers, suggesting that there is a strong demand for young 
post-secondary educated workers, despite the increasing supply of such workers.
How do the candidate explanations for these overall changes in wage inequality 
fit the recent developments in inequality? Even a more nuanced version of the SBTC 
theory has difficulty reconciling the fact that many of the jobs at the bottom end of 
the wage distribution are in personal services. As discussed in more depth below, 
executive pay has increased significantly since the 1990s, with at least some of this 
increase usually being attributed to performance pay. Finally, the process of global-
ization and the associated practice of outsourcing may explain some of the decline 
in wages in the middle of the income distribution. Overall, each of these phenomena 
sheds some light on recent changes in wage inequality, but they fail to provide any 
unifying explanation.
Lemieux argued that the “I” part of the S-D-I explanation is the most important 
for explaining the inequality phenomenon from a comparative perspective. For men, 
unionization was historically concentrated in the middle of the wage distribution; 
as a result, the decline in unionization has had a large impact on this part of the wage 
distribution, possibly contributing to the u-shaped pattern documented above. In 
addition, minimum wages were largely stable in the 1990s, after experiencing de-
clines in the 1980s, and this also could contribute to some of the gains at the lower 
end of the wage scale.
 13 Institutions can also contribute to some of the growth in wage inequality, as occurred in the 
United States and the United Kingdom.
 14 David H. Autor, Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney, “The Polarization of the U.S. 
Labor Market” (2006) 96:2 American Economic Review 189-94.
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Institutional structures, broadly defined, may also be at play in the striking 
changes in relative income among the highest earners. In predominantly English-
speaking countries, starting around 1990, the wage growth in the top part of the 
distribution has been driven by those in the very highest set of wage earners, nota-
bly the top 0.1 percent. A similar trend is not observed in continental European 
countries. The growing concentration of income at the very top end of the income 
distribution is, to many, staggering. The top 0.1 percent of the wage distribution is 
mostly made up of individuals who hold executive positions, such as chief executive 
officers, who command large remuneration packages. Four possible explanations 
have been suggested for the increase in executive pay:
 1. increasing competition for managerial skills;15
 2. increasing use of performance-based compensation such as stock options, 
which require executives to bear more risk;
 3. executives’ influence over their own pay packages through direct involve-
ment in, or control of the composition of, their company’s compensation 
committee; and
 4. tax policy.
Top marginal tax rates have declined substantially since the 1970s in the affected 
countries. This decline may explain shifts toward labour income (from capital earn-
ings and non-taxed benefits) for the top income group.
Lemieux wrapped up his discussion of wage inequality by focusing in particular 
on the implications of the concentration of income at the top of the distribution. 
First, this higher concentration of income at the top means an even higher concen-
tration of taxes paid by top earners because of progressive taxes and third-party 
reporting of labour income (to the tax authority). It may be that the growing in-
equality was one of the reasons why government tax revenues increased so much 
over the 1990s and early 2000s. In particular, we observe that personal income tax 
revenues grew much faster than personal incomes because of the combination of 
higher inequality and progressivity. That said, it is hard to predict what will happen 
to incomes at the very top end, but this should be an important factor to consider 
in predictions of future tax revenues and budget deficits.
DAV ID A LBO U Y—E VA LUATING THE 
EFFICIENC Y O F  EQUIT Y  A ND FEDER A L 
FISC A L  EQUA LIZ ATIO N
Section 36(2) of the Canadian constitution states that the government of Canada is 
“committed to the principle of making equalization payments to ensure that prov-
incial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels 
 15 Xavier Gabaix and Augustin Landier, “Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?” (2008) 123:1 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 49-100.
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of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.”16 This principle is 
embodied in Canada’s equalization program, a transfer program addressing fiscal 
disparities among the provinces. One of the main challenges in designing equalization 
programs is balancing reductions in inequality with a desire for efficient allocations 
of human and physical capital and local public goods. The greater the transfers to 
lower-performing regions, the greater is the worry that there will be inefficient 
migration incentives. Albouy begins his analysis by deriving a theoretical model of 
non-distortionary federal transfers. He then compares Canada’s current equalization 
payments with a benchmark level of efficiency17 and quantifies the effects of any 
deviations from non-distortionary transfer payments.
The fiscal capacities of subnational governments vary according to local tax 
bases. It is useful to break down taxes into two categories: those that are source-
based (levied on fixed immobile attributes such as natural resources or land) and 
those that are residence-based (levied on the incomes of persons residing within the 
jurisdiction.). Categorizing taxes in this way emphasizes the mobility of the taxed 
item. For example, Alberta, a province that is naturally endowed with oil, has a 
potentially rich and relatively immobile tax base. The generally accepted principle is 
that equalization for source-based taxes is both economically efficient and equitable. 
With respect to residence-based taxes, migration can lead to “fiscal externalities”; 
that is, a tax-paying migrant imposes a cost on the region of origin, in the form of a 
higher tax price as the tax base contracts, and bestows a benefit on the region of 
destination, in the form of a lower tax price as the tax base expands. These external 
costs and benefits are not accounted for in the individual’s migration decision, re-
sulting in inefficiencies. This reasoning is the basis for the belief, noted by Albouy, 
that “it is efficient for the federal government to equalize differences in residence-
based tax capacities when tax payments increase with income.”18
Albouy, however, shows that the argument for equalizing residence-based tax 
capacities does not then extend to fiscal transfer differences across regions, since it 
ignores the reason for the existence of income disparities. In particular, he highlights 
the importance of distinguishing between income disparities across regions that arise 
because workers are more skilled and income disparities that are driven by cost-of-
living and amenity values (such as mountain scenery or a temperate climate). In the 
latter case, “identical individuals pay more in federal taxes in high-wage areas than 
in low-wage areas, without receiving greater benefits.”19 The existing model based 
on fiscal externalities only equates nominal incomes. For example, residents of 
Ontario who work in Toronto receive a higher wage, ceteris paribus, than those 
 16 Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11.
 17 David Albouy, Evaluating the Efficiency and Equity of Federal Fiscal Equalization, NBER 
Working Paper no. 16122 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 
2010) (www.personal.umich.edu/~albouy/Equalization/equalization.pdf ).
 18 Ibid., at 2.
 19 Ibid., at 2-3.
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who work in Waterloo, owing to cost-of-living differentials. While nominal income 
levels in Toronto are higher, real income levels are not. In contrast, workers in 
Vancouver are paid a lower wage, ceteris paribus, relative to workers in Toronto, 
owing to the climate-related benefits of living in Vancouver. Albouy indicates that 
one needs to distinguish the Torontos from the Vancouvers—that there is a “need 
to disentangle how regional income differences are due to the composition of the 
labor force or from [sic] the region itself.”20
To this end, Albouy develops a theoretical model of fiscal equalization payments 
that incorporates this income disparity complexity. Ideally, federal transfers go to 
regions where wages are low because of productive factors but, in the process, do not 
offset place-based wage differentials or location factors. That is, it is fine to transfer 
money to offset low incomes associated with low education levels, but not to encour-
age people to stay in an undesirable location. Efficiency arises when measurable net 
fiscal benefits (federal transfers less federal tax burden plus source-based tax revenue) 
internalize any net positive externalities that may differ across regions. Equity arises 
when transfers are targeted to low-income areas with less-skilled workers rather 
than areas with low incomes arising from amenities or the cost of living.
Using this model, Albouy evaluates Canada’s equalization program. He begins 
by calculating the net fiscal benefit from equalization. He first combines data on 
federal transfers to the provinces in 2001 (including payments under the equaliza-
tion program [$14.2 billion], the Canadian health and social transfer [$34.9 billion], 
and other federal transfers [$3.5 billion] with data on the provinces’ source-based 
tax revenues. He then determines differences in federal taxes accounting for differ-
ences in labour force characteristics. To this end, he uses data on wage earners in 
the 2001 Canadian census to estimate interprovincial wage differences controlling 
for observed characteristics.
As noted previously, Albouy is interested in disentangling differences attributable 
to the composition of the labour force from differences attributable to the region 
itself. To estimate the composition effects, he estimates the effects of regional differ-
ences in education rates, experience, industry, occupation, immigration, language, 
and ethnicity. He finds that location effects vary considerably; the territories offer a 
12.7 percent wage premium, while Ontario and British Columbia offer premiums 
of 6 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively. Alberta and Quebec provide a small wage 
penalty, whereas the remaining provinces have significant wage penalties ranging 
from 11.2 percent in Manitoba to 20.9 percent in Prince Edward Island. In contrast, 
Albouy finds that composition effects are extremely small in all provinces. This sug-
gests that workers are not sorting across provinces by skill level. For example, in 
Alberta and British Columbia, workers are better educated, but this effect is offset 
by other factors such as industry, occupation, and the ethnic makeup of the work-
force in the province. Exactly the opposite effect is observed in the Atlantic and 
prairie provinces. In sum, Albouy concludes that wage differences across provinces 
 20 Ibid., at 3.
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are driven entirely by location effects and not composition effects, yielding support 
for his concern about the current structure of fiscal transfers. He also finds that 
these results are not driven by selective migration.
Using the above calculations, Albouy is able to construct measures of the average 
location benefits of each province between 1999 and 2003. During this period, 
Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia were net contributors to federal transfers, 
Quebec was nearly neutral, and the remaining provinces were net recipients, with 
the territories receiving the highest transfers. Unsurprisingly, residents in the three 
provinces that are net contributors to equalization also pay more in federal taxes 
relative to the Canadian average. Albouy also finds that resource-rich provinces 
consistently collect over $2,000 more per capita in source-based revenue than the 
national average. Combining the aforementioned figures to generate the net fiscal 
benefit to each province, one finds that Atlantic Canada, the prairie provinces, and 
the territories benefit from the equalization process. British Columbia, Ontario, 
and Quebec (the relatively high-wage provinces) are clearly disadvantaged through 
the process. This implies that individuals moving to a province with a higher wage 
level are met with a drop in net fiscal benefits. As Albouy notes, “[t]his apparent 
inefficiency may be justified if fiscal benefit differences redistribute resources more 
equitably or correct for externalities.”21
Under principles of equity, one would expect that transfers would favour jurisdic-
tions with populations of low earning potential. In examining the Canadian system, 
Albouy finds that there is no relationship between average predicted income and net 
fiscal benefits. This implies that federal transfers actually appear regressive, and 
accounting for cost-of-living differences only exacerbates this effect. In terms of 
externalities, these arise from the spillover effects that a migrant’s additional spend-
ing on local goods has on the existing population. As noted by Albouy, “[e]fficient 
government transfers are supposed to subsidize location in provinces where this 
externality is strongest.”22 Instead, he finds the exact opposite in Canada, suggesting 
that federal transfers may induce individuals to move to areas where the externality 
is lower than average. Albouy also considers whether or not transfers stabilize dif-
ferences over the long term, thereby creating a positive externality, or whether 
externalities are derived from populating remote areas; however, he finds no support-
ing evidence. He concludes that “there is no compelling evidence of externalities 
from migration strong enough to merit the large fiscal benefit differences.”23
In light of the foregoing results, Albouy concludes that Canada’s federal transfers 
are inefficient, since they subsidize individuals residing in less productive provinces 
and provinces with less desirable amenities. The transfers are also inequitable in 
terms of equalizing differences in labour market endowments. While he does not 
 21 Ibid., at 18.
 22 Ibid., at 20.
 23 Ibid., at 22.
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present an alternative design that would better target these federal transfers, he does 
suggest that efficiency could be improved by increased redistribution of source-
based revenues.
Comments
Christine Neill and John Burbidge each provided brief comments on Albouy’s paper. 
Much of the discussion centred on the degree to which Canada fits the underlying 
assumptions of the model (for example, whether Canada’s migration rates come 
close enough to perfect mobility, and the importance of migration costs) and 
whether alternate unmodelled desires may rationalize the current transfer system. 
Equalization was offered in the constitution to entice jurisdictions into a federation. 
What was efficient in 1867 and 1982 may not still be efficient in 2011. Participants 
wondered whether the transfers would have been “optimal” under Albouy’s criteria 
when they were first designed. Political economy considerations (particularly un-
equal representation in Parliament) were also noted as a potential explanation for 
the current pattern of transfers.
M A RIT  REH AV I—PA RTI A L  REP O RTING:  A N 
E X A MPLE FROM CH A RITA BLE GI V ING
Individual charitable contributions form a significant portion of many households’ 
expenditures. In Canada, 85 percent of Canadian families donate money to char-
ities, amounting to a total of $8.9 billion in 2004.24 Most tax systems recognize 
charitable contributions through either a tax deduction or a tax credit, in part as a 
way to encourage and reward generosity. There is a great deal of interest in meas-
uring the tax price elasticity of charitable giving—the responsiveness of giving to 
changes in the tax price—in order to determine the efficacy of this special tax treat-
ment. Much of the existing knowledge regarding the tax price elasticity of charitable 
giving is from the United States, where a tax deduction is available for those who 
choose to itemize their deductions. Almost all US elasticity estimates are based on 
administrative tax return data for these itemizers.
While several of the papers presented at the workshop highlighted the benefits 
of augmenting survey data with administrative tax and income data (for example 
using the SLID), Rehavi shows that the use of such data is not potentially without 
costs.25 She observes that tax returns are strategic documents, filled out to minimize 
 24 Michael Hall, David Lasby, Glenn Gumulka, and Catherine Tryon, Caring Canadians, Involved 
Canadians: Highlights from the 2004 Canada Survey of Giving, Volunteering and Participating, 
Statistics Canada catalogue no. 71-542-XIE (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2006) (http://www 
.statcan.gc.ca/pub/71-542-x/71-542-x2006001-eng.pdf ).
 25 M. Marit Rehavi, Partial Reporting: An Example from Charitable Giving, Working Paper 
(Vancouver and Ann Arbor, MI: University of British Columbia, Department of Economics and 
University of Michigan, Ross School of Business, 2010) (www.bus.umich.edu/ConferenceFiles/
MTAXI/rehavi_partial_reporting.pdf ).
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tax liability within the confines of the law. The strategic component of reporting 
could bias tax price elasticities calculated from tax return data. In the United States, 
a tax filer can either choose the standard deduction or selectively declare itemized 
deductions. The choice is based on which route will result in the greatest tax savings. 
In addition—and the point of interest for Rehavi—once the decision to itemize is 
made, the tax filer then needs to choose which deductions to claim. This second 
choice is subject to the compliance costs of itemizing, which include the costs of 
compiling the documentation and determining which items are eligible. These com-
pliance costs will be weighed against the tax benefits of reporting the donation, 
implying that the reporting of charitable contributions will be dependent on the tax 
filer’s marginal tax rate. If the latter phenomenon exists, then any tax price elastici-
ties estimated from tax return data will be a composite of the responsiveness of 
charitable donations to the marginal tax rate and the responsiveness of reporting to 
the marginal tax rate. The key empirical question is whether such a reporting effect 
is a large part of tax price elasticities in practice.
In order to answer this question, Rehavi turns to the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) for the years 2000-2006. Beginning in 2000, the PSID contains 
information on the amount of giving that families claimed on their tax returns as 
well as responses to a detailed survey about their charitable donations. This makes 
it possible to directly estimate how donation reporting varies with marginal tax rates 
(both across families and within families over time) and the effect on tax price elas-
ticity estimates.
Rehavi shows that charitable contributions are indeed underreported by tax filers 
who itemize on their tax returns: a full 60 percent of these individuals reported no 
charitable giving on their tax returns but reported positive charitable donations in 
the PSID survey. On average, $330 of donations per itemizing family are not re-
ported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In addition, Rehavi demonstrates that 
the gap between the survey and tax return measures of charitable contributions sys-
tematically varies with the tax rate. These differences suggest that as much as a third 
of the tax price elasticity of charitable giving estimated from administrative tax data 
may be endogenous reporting.
The policy implications of this work are twofold. First, changes in the tax price 
of charitable giving will influence not only the number and amount of charitable 
contributions but also the amount of charitable contributions reported on tax re-
turns. Second, the influence of the tax price of charitable giving on actual donations 
is not as strong as initially thought, since many tax filers give to charity without 
directly benefiting from the preferential tax treatment. As Rehavi notes, some of 
these unreported gifts may be ineligible for favourable tax treatment by the IRS. 
However, even if all of the reporting effect were the shifting of charitable donations 
to charities eligible for preferential tax treatment, the result would be to reallocate 
the same amount of funds among charities rather than generate extra charitable 
dollars. The social welfare implications of such shifting depend on one’s beliefs 
about the relative social benefit of donations to charities that are registered with 
the IRS.
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Comments
The discussants for this paper were Alan Macnaughton and Dwayne Benjamin. The 
paper confirms a well-known fact, that incentives matter with respect to reporting 
behaviour, and it demonstrates how costs specifically influence the reporting of 
charitable donations on tax returns. While Canada’s tax preferences for charitable 
giving differ in structure from those in the United States, the ability to carry dona-
tions forward and thus maximize the tax benefit of donations at a higher marginal 
tax rate makes strategic filing decisions a concern here as well.
Most of the discussants’ concerns revolved around the quality and reliability of the 
PSID survey data. First, the limited number of questions on the PSID survey regarding 
donation behaviour may be of concern, since it has been shown that fewer questions 
regarding spending decisions result in an underestimation of actual consumption26 
(although it is not clear that the underreporting induced by this survey design would 
co-vary with families’ marginal tax rates). Second, there was extensive discussion 
about the potential inclusion of donations ineligible for tax deductions in the PSID 
measures of charitable donations. Third, the PSID survey is a recall survey and relies 
on the ability of respondents to accurately remember how they have reported their 
donations, well after the fact and without consulting their records. To the extent that 
these biases co-vary with families’ marginal tax rates over time, they could bias esti-
mates of the share of the tax price elasticity that is attributable to partial reporting.
JE A N - FR A NCO IS WEN A ND DA NIEL  V.  GO RD O N—
A N EMPIRIC A L  MO DEL O F  TA X CO N V E X IT Y  A ND 
SELF- EMPLOYMENT
Governments across Canada promote entrepreneurship as a key to job creation, in-
novation, and economic growth. Reductions in personal income tax rates are often 
presented as a policy lever that encourages entrepreneurship. High personal income 
taxes, it is argued, distort the risk-to-reward ratio. However, it is not high income tax 
rates themselves that distort the risk-to-reward ratio, but rather the rising progres-
sivity of the tax rate schedule. Since the reward from successful entrepreneurial 
activities is high income returns, the more progressive a tax system, the greater is 
the penalty for entrepreneurial success. More importantly, a progressive tax system 
that excludes the ability to average incomes across years penalizes individuals with 
highly volatile annual incomes, including many entrepreneurs. For example, an in-
dividual earning $60,000 in year one and $0 in year two will pay $12,193 in total 
income taxes (using tax information from 2011), while an individual earning 
$30,000 in both years will pay only $7,956. Wen and Gordon call this phenomenon 
tax convexity (also known as the “success tax”).27
 26 Martin Browning, Thomas F. Crossley, and Guglielmo Weber, “Asking Consumption 
Questions in General Purpose Surveys” (2003) 113:491 Economic Journal F540-67. 
 27 Jean-Francois Wen and Daniel V. Gordon, An Empirical Model of Tax Convexity and Self-
Employment, Working Paper (Calgary: University of Calgary, Department of Economics, 2010) 
(http://econ.ucalgary.ca/sites/econ.ucalgary.ca/files/publications/JFSelfemployment_model6.pdf ).
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Using self-employment as a proxy for entrepreneurship, Wen and Gordon test 
empirically whether the tax and transfer system influences the choice between self-
employment and employed labour. Their objective is to measure tax convexity, 
defined as “the expected value of the tax liability of an entrepreneur facing a distri-
bution of possible returns,” and “to compare this burden with the same individual’s 
predicted tax liability.”28 An individual will be deterred from self-employment if the 
expected tax liability exceeds the predicted liability. This occurs if the tax system 
penalizes success more than it offsets failure. Wen and Gordon go beyond just ex-
amining marginal income tax rates and thresholds, and also include payroll taxes, 
tax credits and their clawbacks, loss offset provisions, and other tax and transfer 
considerations in their analysis.
To calculate the effect of tax convexity on self-employment, Wen and Gordon 
use SLID data, discussed previously, from 1999 to 2005. Conducting this analysis 
using Canadian data as opposed to US data is informative for several reasons. First, 
in Canada a personal dividend tax credit exists that partially offsets corporate taxes, 
meaning that “[t]he personal and corporate income tax systems are integrated for 
incorporated businesses earning up to $500,000 (in 2009).”29 Second, tax rates are 
applied to the individual and are not based on household income. Third, the proceeds 
from the sale of small business shares are subject to a lifetime capital gains exemp-
tion, provided that specific criteria are met. Fourth, statutory personal income tax 
rates began to be fully indexed in 2000, whereas previously indexation was limited 
to inflation increases above 3 percent. These differences suggest that results from 
Canada may differ from those obtained using US data. In addition, the Canadian 
data cover a period of major tax reform. In 2001, the rates for the first two statutory 
tax brackets were reduced, the surtax was eliminated, the capital gains inclusion rate 
was dropped to 50 percent, and the corporate tax rate was cut from 28 percent to 
21 percent for small business income between $200,000 and $300,000. These com-
bined reforms were designed in part to promote entrepreneurship and may do so by 
decreasing tax convexity. On average, the self-employed have both lower earnings 
and greater variance in their earnings, an observation that is consistent with the 
higher risk associated with self-employment. The self-employed also have higher 
levels of investment and capital income, and are older, more likely to be married, 
and less likely to work in white-collar jobs.
Wen and Gordon categorize convexity into two types: upside convexity and 
downside convexity. Upside tax convexity occurs when tax rates increase as income 
increases, as discussed above. Downside convexity occurs when tax rates decrease as 
income decreases. Decomposing convexity in this manner allows for asymmetric 
responses, with the overall effect of tax progressivity on self-employment being the 
sum of these two effects. Using an expected earnings equation, Wen and Gordon 
predict earnings and total income for individuals in circumstances of self-employment 
 28 Ibid., at 3.
 29 Ibid., at 4.
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and paid employment. The residuals from the earnings equation are used to calcu-
late the variance of earnings in self-employment for both the self-employed and the 
employed. This earnings variance is used to establish the predicted high income 
state and the predicted low income state. Wen and Gordon then calculate the ex-
pected tax liabilities in these two income states to obtain measures of the upside and 
downside tax convexity of the tax regime.
Wen and Gordon examine how these factors (upside tax convexity, downside tax 
convexity, and net-of-tax income differences) influence the probability that an in-
dividual will be self-employed, ceteris paribus. They find that upside tax convexity 
is negatively related to the self-employment rate, while downside tax convexity is 
positively related to that rate. They also find that upside tax convexity has a much 
larger influence on the self-employment rate than downside convexity, suggesting 
that tax progressivity does influence the decision to become self-employed. This 
result calls into question the hypothesis that high taxes encourage self-employment 
owing to the opportunity to evade taxes that results from the lack of third-party 
reporting. Net-of-tax income differences are also important, with the probability of 
becoming self-employed increasing in the difference between net-of-tax income in 
the self-employed and employed state.
Wen and Gordon conclude by examining the effects of the 2001 tax policy 
changes on the self-employment rate. Overall, they find that the 2001 tax reforms 
would have increased the self-employment rate by 1.1 percent for white-collar 
workers and 0.6 percent for blue-collar workers. Which of these tax reforms, how-
ever, drive this result? Wen and Gordon decompose the major changes in personal 
income tax rates to examine the likely effect of each on the self-employment rate. 
They find that most of the change in entrepreneurship is driven by the reduction of 
the middle tax bracket.
Wen and Gordon acknowledge that the effects of these tax changes on the self-
employment rate are very modest, likely owing to the fact that seemingly large cuts 
to the rates translate into small increases in take-home income. However, they note 
that another reason is the offsetting effect of these tax reforms on upside tax convex-
ity, downside tax convexity, and net-of-tax income differences. For example, cuts to 
the second tax bracket reduce upside tax convexity (increasing self-employment), 
but reduce self-employment through net-of-tax income changes. This occurs be-
cause the income from employment is higher and therefore the rate cuts favour 
employment.
Comments
The policy consequences of these findings are significant and provide fresh insights 
into how the design of tax policy influences self-employment. The main message is 
that designing tax reforms to increase self-employment is extremely difficult, owing 
to the counteracting effects. The most successful policy is likely to be one that cuts 
tax rates on self-employment income but not wage income. Participants noted that 
this could be effected by returning to an income-averaging system, similar to that 
which was in place in Canada between 1971 and 1987. (Income averaging currently 
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exists only for self-employment income from farming.) It was noted that, from an 
administrative viewpoint, income averaging is less difficult than it was in the past 
because of advances in computing technology and tax software. Moreover, RRSP 
deductions provide a weak substitution for income averaging, mostly through con-
tribution limits, which could be raised for the self-employed to better mimic the 
effects of strict income averaging.
Herb Schuetze and Gustavo Bobonis provided further commentary on Wen and 
Gordon’s paper. Their comments reinforced the importance of the paper—that is, 
examining policies that target self-employment is important because labour market 
policies, such as tax reform, are usually developed with wage employees in mind. 
That focus is unfortunate, since those policies can and often do have perverse ef-
fects on the self-employed, a point made clear when one examines the income tax 
system. Tax policy affecting the self-employed therefore needs to be considered 
beyond the traditional focus on encouraging entrepreneurship. Participants also re-
inforced the importance of conducting empirical work in this area in Canada. Most 
of the existing research uses US data, and that country, as we have noted, has a very 
different system of taxes and transfers. Examining Canada can help us, in particular, 
to understand the effect of the social safety net on the self-employment rate. This 
is an important factor since most individuals who venture into self-employment will 
fail at their endeavours in the first five years. Wen and Gordon’s paper also makes an 
important contribution by developing a much-improved measure of tax convexity.
The discussants also made several suggestions for enriching the research results. 
First, they raised the issue of tax evasion (either through tax non-compliance or 
income splitting) and the role that it may play in both the decision to be self-
employed and the empirical results. Second, they encouraged the authors to exploit 
the panel nature of the SLID to examine transitions into and out of self-employment. 
In addition, there is room to further exploit the 2001 tax changes. The discussants 
suggested that it would be beneficial to examine directly the detailed response of 
self-employment rates to the 2001 policy changes and to compare them with the 
specific countervailing effects predicted by the empirical exercise. Finally, they sug-
gested that capital requirements, capital constraints, and entrepreneurial ability are 
important complements to entrepreneurial activities, and that it would therefore be 
beneficial to incorporate these factors into the analysis.
BEN DACHIS ,  GILLE S DUR A NTO N ,  A ND 
M AT THE W A .  T URNER—THE EFFEC T S O F 
L A ND TR A NSFER TA X E S O N RE A L  E S TATE 
M A RK E T S:  E V IDENCE FROM A N AT UR A L 
E X PERIMENT IN  TO RO NTO
Most jurisdictions impose a tax on real estate transactions as a revenue-generating 
device. These taxes, known as either land, property, deed, or real estate transfer 
taxes (collectively, transfer taxes), are generally imposed on real estate transactions 
and must be paid upon the registration of a transfer of property title. The amount of 
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taxes owing at the time of transfer is usually based on a flat or sliding percentage 
of the amount that the buyer paid for the property. Because these taxes increase the 
cost of real estate transactions, it is generally acknowledged that they act as a disin-
centive to buying real estate and may be passed through to sellers in the form of 
lower prices. However, little is actually known about the magnitude of these effects. 
Obtaining this information is important because many jurisdictions offer some form 
of relief to buyers who meet certain criteria, such as first-time home buyers. For 
example, the 2009 US Housing Stimulus Bill provided partial relief to all home buy-
ers, albeit temporarily, on the assumption that these forms of tax relief reduce the 
disincentive to buy.
Municipalities in Canada are not permitted to impose their own transfer taxes 
unless they have been explicitly granted the authority to do so by the provincial 
government. Currently, the only municipal jurisdictions that do impose such taxes 
are municipalities in Nova Scotia, which have the authority to enact deed transfer 
taxes (Nova Scotia does not have a provincial transfer tax), and the city of Toronto, 
which in 2007 was granted special authority to impose municipal transfer taxes.
The city of Toronto’s transfer tax came into effect on January 1, 2008. The tax 
follows a progressive tax regime based on the purchase price of the property: the 
first $55,000 in value is taxed at a rate of 0.5 percent, the value between $55,000 and 
$400,000 is taxed at a rate of 1.0 percent, and the remainder is taxed at a rate of 
2.0 percent. As in most jurisdictions, first-time home buyers are eligible for tax re-
lief through a maximum rebate of $3,725. The city of Toronto land transfer tax 
(LTT) is in addition to the provincial transfer tax.
Dachis, Duranton, and Turner use the introduction of the Toronto LTT to ex-
plore the effect of transfer taxes on real estate prices and transactions in the city of 
Toronto.30 They obtain data from the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) for single-
family homes sold in the Greater Toronto Area between January 2006 and August 
2008. The MLS data include information on the sale price, sale date, closing date, 
various house characteristics, and the property’s postal code. Dachis et al. use the 
property’s postal code and geographic information systems software to determine 
the municipality in which the property is located and thus identify properties sub-
ject to the Toronto LTT.
Using data for sales in the city of Toronto as well as surrounding jurisdictions 
(Mississauga, Brampton, Vaughan, Richmond Hill, Markham, and Pickering), Dachis 
et al. compare transactions before and after the imposition of the LTT in the city of 
Toronto with transactions in nearby jurisdictions that are not subject to the tax. 
This quasi-experimental design treats sales in the city of Toronto as the treatment 
group and sales in neighbouring jurisdictions as the control group, allowing Dachis 
 30 Ben Dachis, Gilles Duranton, and Matthew A. Turner, The Effects of Land Transfer Taxes on Real 
Estate Markets: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Toronto, Working Paper (Toronto: University 
of Toronto, Department of Economics, February 2011) (http://individual.utoronto.ca/gilles/
Papers/TREB.pdf ).
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et al. to isolate the effect of the policy change in January 2008 from other factors, 
such as economic climate and sales seasonality, which should affect both treatment 
and control jurisdictions equally. In order to ensure that they do not confound dif-
ferential trends with treatment effects, Dachis et al. further restrict their analysis to 
sales within three kilometres of the city of Toronto border. That is, their approach 
“boils down to a differences-in-differences estimation for observations on a narrow 
band on both sides of the Toronto border.”31
Using their modified quasi-experimental design, Dachis et al. find that the im-
position of the LTT in the city of Toronto led to a 15 percent decline in the number 
of houses sold, a result that they find to be robust to various specifications. They 
also explore the effect of the policy change on the sale price of homes and find that 
the new transfer tax led to a decline in housing prices that was approximately equal 
to the magnitude of the tax. That is, the new transfer tax was almost perfectly offset 
through a corresponding decrease in the purchase price, meaning that the tax was 
“fully capitalized into land prices.”32 Translating these figures into welfare, Dachis 
et al. find that the total welfare losses of the tax, which are effectively the cost of 
forgone mobility, were equivalent to over 12 percent of the revenue raised, or about 
$19 million per year for Toronto. They conclude by suggesting that “welfare would 
be improved by shifting the burden of public finance from land transfer taxes to 
ordinary property taxes.”33
Comments
The paper was discussed by Abigail Payne and Daniel Parent. Much of the discus-
sion focused on the underlying assumptions of the estimation strategy. A necessary 
assumption is that the “real estate market did not anticipate the tax,”34 but given 
that the special authority to impose the tax was granted a full year before the tax was 
implemented, and that discussions leading up to the imposition of the tax suggested 
that its imposition in the city of Toronto was an acute possibility, it is not clear that 
this assumption strictly holds. If the assumption does not hold, this poses problems 
for identifying the true policy date. If the tax was anticipated, the behavioural 
changes as a result of the policy become blurred, and it is not clear what is the true 
pre-policy period and what is the true post-policy period. Given the relatively nar-
row window of time studied, it is also not clear whether these effects are limited to 
the short run or will persist in the long run. A followup study on how these effects 
evolve and how the market adjusts would be beneficial in this regard.
The discussion also focused on the definition of the alternative for the welfare 
analysis. The city of Toronto needed to increase it budgetary revenues. Therefore, 
 31 Ibid., at 10.
 32 Ibid., at 25.
 33 Ibid.
 34 Ibid., at 6.
804  n  canadian tax journal / revue fiscale canadienne (2011) 59:4
one would want to compare the welfare effects of the LTT with the welfare effects 
of the alternatives for generating the needed revenue. Finally, as noted above, it is 
not clear whether the observed effects are temporary or long-lived, and these are 
equally important considerations in understanding the adjustment factors. Again, a 
followup study would be useful.
CO NCLUSIO N
The Tax Time workshop provided an opportunity to showcase current research 
tackling public policy issues in the field of empirical public finance. An underlying 
theme of many of the papers was inequality. Income constraints differ enormously 
across individuals, time, and countries. A substantial public policy problem is when, 
how, and to what extent governments should intervene to create income equity. The 
answers to these types of questions are difficult and rely on many considerations 
outside the purview of economic research. However, to even attempt to design policy 
responses, we need to know how much inequality and poverty there is in Canada, 
the sources of inequality and poverty, and the costs and benefits of specific policies. 
The work by Milligan, Bibi et al., Lemieux, and Albouy exemplifies public finance 
research that is tackling these complexities of income inequality.
Taxes are one of the primary tools that governments use both to redistribute 
wealth and to encourage desired choices. It is therefore fitting that the research 
presented also focused on their role. The papers by Rehavi, Wen and Gordon, and 
Dachis et al. consider how various tax measures contribute to the loss of social 
welfare, by either contributing to compliance and reporting costs, curtailing entre-
preneurial behaviour, or influencing mobility decisions. This research emphasizes 
the importance of understanding the consequences (both intended and unintended) 
of the design, delivery, and implementation of taxes.
Evidence from academic research can be an important input to policy decisions. 
The availability of clear policy evidence clarifies the choices facing public officials 
and enables them to maximize the return on the resources at their disposal. It is to 
be hoped that the papers presented at the Tax Time workshop help to fulfill that 
role.
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